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Introduction 
 
Both global governance and the sub-set of issues that may be termed ‘internet 
governance’ are vast and complex issue areas. The difficulties of trying to ‘legislate’ at 
the global level – efforts that must encompass the economic, cultural, developmental, 
legal, and political concerns of diverse states and other stakeholders – are further 
complicated by the technological conundrums encountered in cyberspace. The 
unleashing of the so-called ‘Global War on Terrorism’ (GWOT) complicates things yet 
further. Today, both sub-state and non-state actors are said to be harnessing – or 
preparing to harness – the power of the internet to harass and attack their foes. Clearly, 
international terrorism had already been a significant security issue prior to 11 
September 2001 (hereafter ‘9/11’) and the emergence of the internet in the decade 
before. Together, however, the events of 9/11 and advancements in ICTs have added 
new dimensions to the problem. In newspapers and magazines, in film and on 
television, and in research and analysis, ‘cyber-terrorism’ has become a buzzword. 
Since the events of 9/11, the question on everybody’s lips appears to be ‘is cyber-
terrorism next?’ It is generally agreed that the potential for a ‘digital 9/11’ in the near 
future is not great. This does not mean that IR scholars may continue to ignore the 
transformative powers of the internet.  
This paper explores the difficulties of internet governance in the light of terrorists’ 
increasing use of the medium. In particular, it details the clampdown on the burgeoning 
internet presence of extremist groups, undertaken by both state-based and sub-state 
actors, in the wake of the attacks of 9/11 in the US and of July 2005 in London. The 
ensuing governance challenges are many and varied, but include  
 
- Debates over the role of various actors in the governance process, including 
national governments, hacktivists, and Internet Service Providers (ISPs)  
- The appropriate legislative response to the terrorist internet presence 
- The debate over free speech vs. limits on speech 
 
The description and analysis of these challenges are at the centre of this paper. 
First, however, it is worth considering what exactly is meant by the term ‘internet 
governance’.  
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What is Meant by ‘Internet Governance’? 
 
The internet had unique governance structures during its development and early growth. 
It began life as a government project: in the late 1960s, the US government sponsored 
the establishment of the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which 
was charged with developing a resilient communication facility designed to survive a 
nuclear attack. By the 1980s, a wider community was using the facilities of this 
network, which had come to be referred to as the internet. In 1986, the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) was established to manage the further development of 
the internet through a cooperative, consensus-based decision-making process involving 
a wide variety of individuals. However, in 1994, the US National Science Foundation 
decided to involve the private sector by subcontracting the management of the Domain 
Name System (DNS) to Network Solutions Inc. (NSI). This angered many end users 
and resulted in a conflict, which was only resolved in 1998 with the establishment of a 
new organisation, the Internet Company for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). 
Since the establishment of ICANN, the debate on internet governance has been 
characterised by the more direct involvement of national governments, mainly through 
the UN framework and institutions. The first World Summit on the Information Society 
(WSIS), held in Geneva in December 2003, officially placed the question of internet 
governance on diplomatic agendas. The Declaration of Principles and Action Plan 
adopted at WSIS 2003 proposed a number of actions in the field of internet governance, 
including the establishment of a Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG).1 This 
became necessary because each of the terms ‘internet’ and ‘governance’ was the subject 
of controversy as, indeed, was the concept of ‘internet governance’ itself.  
It was the second part of the concept (i.e. ‘governance’) that was the subject of 
particular controversy, especially during the WSIS. Misunderstandings stemmed from 
terminological confusion arising out of the use of the term ‘governance’ as a synonym 
for ‘government’. When the term ‘internet governance’ was introduced in the WSIS 
process, many countries linked it to the concept of government. One of the 
consequences was the belief that internet governance issues should be addressed 
primarily at the inter-governmental level with only the limited participation of other 
actors. What were the main reasons for this terminological confusion? Gelbstein and 
Kurbalija argue that it is not necessarily obvious to many that the term ‘governance’ 
does not mean ‘government’. They point out, for example, that the term ‘good 
governance’ has been used by the World Bank to promote the reform of states by 
introducing more transparency, reducing corruption, and increasing the efficiency of 
administration and that, in this context, the term ‘governance’ was directly related to 
core government functions.2 
In his analysis of internet governance, Klein draws on Robert Dahl’s seminal text 
Democracy and Its Critics (1989), in which Dahl identifies what he views as the 
minimal conditions necessary for the establishment of an effective system of 
governance: authority, law, sanctions, and jurisdiction. ‘These four mechanisms make 
governance possible: the governing authority can make a policy decision that applies 
within its jurisdiction, embodying that decision in law and imposing sanctions on 
whomever disobeys’ [italics in original].3 Dahl’s conception of governance is quite 
hierarchical, however, and closer to ‘government’ than perhaps many of those 
connected with the development of the internet – other than national governments – 
might find acceptable. Indeed, the WGIG has since published the following working 
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definition of internet governance: ‘Internet governance is the development and 
application by Governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective 
roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes 
that shape the evolution and use of the Internet.’4 This does not mean that the four issues 
identified by Dahl are of no importance; they arise repeatedly in any discussion of the 
relationship between terrorist use of the internet and internet governance; what the 
WGIG definition does draw our attention to, however, is the legacy of the early years of 
the internet’s development and the resultant importance of actors-other-than-states in 
the internet governance process.  
 
 
Terrorism and the Internet: A Brief History 
 
In a little over four weeks in April and May 2004, the now-deceased Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, one-time leader of ‘al-Qaida in Iraq’, ‘rocketed to worldwide fame, or infamy, 
by a deliberate combination of extreme violence and internet publicity’.5 In early April 
2004, Zarqawi posted online a 30-minute audio recording which explained who he was, 
why he was fighting, and details of the attacks for which he and his group were 
responsible. Prior to the instigation of his internet-based PR campaign, each of 
Zarqawi’s attacks had to kill large numbers of people in order to get noticed in the chaos 
and mounting daily death toll in Iraq. By going online, however, Zarqawi was able to 
both control the interpretation of his violent actions and achieve greater impact with 
smaller operations.  
In May 2004, Zarqawi took things a step further and used the internet’s force-
multiplying power to the maximum effect when he was videotaped cutting off the head 
of a US hostage and had the footage posted online. The purpose of this video was to 
create images that would grab the attention of allies and enemies alike. In this respect, it 
was an undoubted success; Zarqawi risked very little in this undertaking, but 
accomplished ‘as much if not more to undermine US plans as a bomb that killed 100 
people in Najaf. And [at the same time] made himself a hero to jihadis across the 
world.’6 The free availability of this and other grisly ‘snuff movies’ on the internet led 
to a realisation that the most important aspect of the terrorism-internet relationship was 
not the much discussed ‘cyber-terrorism’, but those more mundane and everyday 
terrorist uses of the internet, from information provision to recruitment, which have a 
history stretching back for many years before Zarqawi’s appearance on the internet. 
Today, virtually every active militant group has an online presence, and many 
groups are the subjects of more than one site. A number of these groups have already 
shown a clear understanding of the power of the global information network to publicise 
their position. The Lebanese Hizbollah has clearly demonstrated this ability, as have the 
Tamil Tigers, al-Qaida, and numerous other political violence movements that maintain 
a web presence. Unsurprisingly, in the post-9/11 world, the latter are subject to much 
increased scrutiny. The remainder of this paper is concerned with describing and 
analysing the attempts at internet governance instigated by those with concerns about 
increasing extremist use of the internet for the purposes of, amongst other things, 
information dissemination and thence recruitment. Much of the following is therefore 
concerned with what is called ‘content control’: efforts on the part of stakeholders to 
regulate what sort of material is available on the internet, including the removal of 
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‘objectionable’ materials currently accessible and the erection of barriers to the 
uploading of such materials in the future.  
 
 
Content Control Issues 
 
Who is Responsible for Content Policy?  
When it comes to terrorism, governments are generally held to be the main players in 
the area of content control, as it is they who prescribe what should be controlled and 
how. Some groups of individual users, such as hacktivists, are also keen to play their 
part, however, and indeed have had some success in disrupting the online presence of a 
number of terrorist organisations. In practical terms, of course, both legislated content 
control and private initiatives require the participation of private enterprises, particularly 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and search engine companies, and pressure has 
increasingly been brought to bear on such firms, both by nation-states and private 
groups and individuals, to regulate terrorism-related content. The availability of 
appropriate control technologies is also a matter for discussion.  
 
Three Approaches to Content Policy 
Content policy is generally approached from one of three standpoints: 1.) Human rights 
(freedom of expression and right to communicate), 2.) Government (legislated content 
control), 3.) Technology (tools for content control).  
Freedom of expression and the right to seek, receive, and impart information is a 
fundamental human right, according to Article 19 of the UN’s Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948). On the other hand, the Declaration also recognises that freedom 
of expression is counter-balanced by the right of states to limit freedom of expression 
for the sake of morality, public order, and general welfare (Article 29). Thus, both the 
discussion and the implementation of Article 19 must be put in the context of 
establishing a proper balance between these two concerns. This ambiguous international 
regime opens many possibilities for different interpretations of norms relating to speech, 
and ultimately for different implementations. 
Content control is very much bound up with free-speech issues and concerns 
regarding restrictions on freedom of expression. Controls on internet-based speech are 
especially contentious in the US context, where the First Amendment guarantees broad 
freedom of expression, even the right to publish hate speech and similar material. 
Achieving a proper balance between content control and freedom of expression has 
therefore proven to be a considerable challenge, and much of the recent internet 
governance debate, including court cases and legislation, has been concerned with 
finding this balance. Whereas the US Congress has inclined towards stricter content 
control, particularly in the wake of the events of 9/11, the US Supreme Court has sought 
to uphold First Amendment protections. This commitment to freedom of expression is 
what largely shapes the US position in the international debate on internet governance. 
So while the US has signed on to the Cybercrime Convention, it is constitutionally 
barred from signing the Additional Protocol to this convention that deals with the 
criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer 
systems.7 In other words, while the Additional Protocol is now available to EU 
governments and other signatories, adding to other hate crimes statutes under which 
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they may prosecute terrorist groups and their supporters who publish hate material 
online, the same legal options are not available to the US authorities. 
It is for this reason that many terrorist groups’ sites are hosted in the US. For 
example, a Connecticut-based ISP was at one time providing co-location and virtual 
hosting services for a Hamas site in data centres located in Connecticut and Chicago. 
While sites such as those maintained by Hamas have been subject to more intense 
scrutiny following the events of 9/11, similar websites had already been the subject of 
debate in the US even before the events of 9/11. In 1997, controversy erupted when it 
was revealed that the State University of New York (SUNY) at Binghamton was 
hosting the website of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and that a 
Tupac Amaru (MRTA) solidarity site was operating out of the University of California 
at San Diego (UCSD). SUNY officials promptly shut down the FARC site. In San 
Diego, officials decided in favour of free speech, and the Tupac Amaru site remained in 
operation on UCSD’s servers for some years.  
Constitutional guarantees notwithstanding, states are not technologically impotent 
when faced with political violence groups seeking to use the internet for information 
dissemination purposes. Rather, states have access to myriad technologies with which 
they can limit and constrain how dissidents are able to use the internet. The successful 
use of the internet for recruitment and other types of political action is based on the 
assumption that both users and audiences have access to the messages communicated 
via the internet. States can therefore constrain the effectiveness of these cyber-based 
strategies by limiting user and audience access to internet technologies, either by 
actively censoring internet content or by controlling the internet infrastructure, or by 
some combination of the two. The common element for governmental filtering is 
generally an index of websites that citizens are blocked from accessing. If a website 
appears on this list, access will not be granted. Technically speaking, the filtering 
typically utilises router-based IP blocking, proxy servers, and DNS redirection. Filtering 
of content is carried out in many countries: in addition to those countries, such as China, 
Saudi Arabia, and Singapore, which are usually associated with such practices, other 
countries increasingly practice censorship also. For example, Australia has a filtering 
system for specific national pages, while the German state of North-Rhine-Westphalia 
requires ISPs to filter access to mainly, but not solely, neo-Nazi sites. 
 
Three Types of Content 
Discussions about content also usually focus on three types. The first type consists of 
content where a global consensus regarding its control exists. Control of the 
dissemination of child pornography online is the area in which the greatest amount of 
consensus currently exists. While incitement or organisation of terrorist acts are 
prohibited by international law (ius cogens) – that is, a general consensus about the need 
to remove this content from the Net has been established – disputes still arise. This is 
because there is no globally accepted definition of terrorism, which makes it difficult, 
not to say impossible, to come to any agreement as to what exactly might constitute 
terrorism-support in any given instance.  
In terms of controls, the second type of content that is generally discussed is that 
which might be sensitive for particular countries, regions, or ethnic groups due to their 
particular religious and/or cultural values. There can be little doubt that globalized, 
high-volume, and more intensive communication challenges cultural and religious 
values held in differing regional, national, and local spaces. In fact, most internet court 
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cases are concerned with this type of content. Germany has very developed 
jurisprudence in this area, with many court cases against those responsible for websites 
hosting Nazi materials. In the Yahoo! Case, a French court requested that Yahoo.com 
(USA) prohibit French citizens from accessing parts of a website selling Nazi 
memorabilia. Most content control in Asia and the Middle East is officially justified as 
the protection of specific cultural values. This usually includes blocking access to 
pornographic and gambling sites, but also those of a radical political nature. 
This brings the discussion to the third type of content, which consists of politically 
and ideologically sensitive materials. In essence, this involves internet censorship. 
There is a dilemma here between the ‘real’ and ‘cyber’ worlds. Existing rules about 
speech, promulgated for application in the real world, can be implemented on the 
internet. This is probably best illustrated within the European context where, for 
example, the EU Council Framework Decision on Combating Racism and Xenophobia 
explicitly indicates ‘what is illegal off-line is illegal on-line.’8 However, one of the 
arguments put forward by those who believe that the internet requires specific 
legislation tailored to its specific characteristics is that quantity (i.e. intensity of 
communication, number of messages, etc.) makes a qualitative difference. In this view, 
the problem of hate and terrorism-related speech is not that no regulation against it has 
been enacted, but that the share and spread of the internet render cyber-based hate and 
terrorism different kinds of legal problems than their ‘real world’ equivalents. In 
particular, more individuals are exposed to this type of speech and it is difficult to 
enforce existing rules. Therefore, the difference that the internet brings is mainly related 
to problems of enforcement, not the rules themselves. 
 
 
The Contemporary Legislative Landscape 
 
The legal vacuum in the field of content policy that characterised early internet use 
provided national governments with high levels of discretion in content control. 
National regulation in the field of content policy may provide better protection for 
human rights and resolve the sometimes-ambiguous roles of ISPs, enforcement 
agencies, and other players, but such laws may also prove highly divisive. In recent 
years, many countries have for the first time introduced internet content policy 
legislation. Some of this legislation was introduced as a result of the boom in internet 
use and the perceived need to protect the interests of user-citizens; however, a large 
amount of content policy was also hastily promulgated in the wake of 9/11 on the basis 
of perceived risks to national security. Civil libertarians and others point to the knee-
jerk nature and dubious efficacy of some such policies.  
 
The US Position  
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the FBI was involved in the official closure of 
hundreds – if not thousands – of US-based internet sites. For instance, several radical 
internet radio shows, including IRA Radio, Al Lewis Live and Our Americas, were 
pulled by an Indiana ISP in late September 2001 after the FBI contacted them and 
advised that their assets could be seized for promoting terrorism.9 However, because 
these and many of the other sites that were closed didn’t directly incite violence or raise 
money, they were not contravening US law and many were therefore up and running 
again relatively shortly after they had been shut down.  
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Of all the legislation promulgated in the wake of 9/11, the most relevant in terms 
of internet governance is the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, which makes it illegal to 
advise or assist terrorists, such as via an internet site. The case of Babar Ahmad is an 
interesting one in this regard. Ahmad, a British citizen, was the publisher of two 
prominent jihadi websites, azzam.com and qoqaz.com, which were hosted in the US and 
through which he is accused of raising money for Islamic militants in Chechnya and 
elsewhere. The UK government has agreed to a US extradition request and Ahmad is to 
be tried in the US on charges relating to his use of the internet for terrorism-related 
purposes, which fall under the heading of ‘conspiracy to provide material support to 
terrorists’. This includes not just the solicitation of financial support referred to above, 
but also, according to an affidavit filed in US District Court in Connecticut in 2004, 
urging all Muslims to ‘use every means at their disposal to undertake military and 
physical training for jihad’ and providing ‘explicit instructions’ about how to raise funds 
and funnel these to violent fundamentalist organizations through front organizations 
operating as charities.  
Similar charges as those pending against Ahmad have been brought against other 
US residents. However, due to the high levels of speech protection in the US referred to 
earlier, at least two defendants have so far been tried and freed without charge on the 
basis of similar complaints: these are Sami Omas al-Hussayen, a Ph.D. candidate in 
computer science at the University of Idaho who established and maintained a radical 
website, and Sami Amin al-Arian, a professor at the University of South Florida who 
was tried on charges relating to, amongst other things, his utilization of the internet to 
publish and catalogue acts of violence committed by Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Babar 
Ahmad’s trial will serve as yet another test of the new US anti-terrorism law that makes 
it a crime to provide material support in the form of expert advice or assistance to 
terrorists, including IT support. Clearly, Ahmad’s case will be one to watch in terms of 
its impact on terrorism-related internet-based speech in the US.  
 
The UK Position 
The July 2005 London bombings provided the spur for the British government to act 
against terrorist websites operating out of the UK. In the immediate aftermath of the 
attacks, the then-home secretary, Charles Clarke, indicated in a parliamentary speech 
that he would be seeking to extend the state’s powers ‘to deal with those who foment 
terrorism, or seek to provoke others to commit terrorist acts’. In his speech, Clarke 
noted specifically that ‘running websites or writing articles that are intended to foment 
or provoke terrorism’ were activities that would fall within the ambit of these new 
powers.10 The UK Prevention of Terrorism Bill 2005 narrowly avoided defeat in 
Westminster in October 2005; opposition centered on two key measures: new police 
powers to detain suspects for up to 90 days without charges and a proposed offense of 
‘encouragement or glorification of terrorism’. With regard to the ‘glorification of 
terrorism’, such a measure would clearly criminalize the establishment, maintenance, 
and hosting of many websites currently operational within the UK.  
The major criticism, of course, is that the latter clause may serve to stifle 
legitimate political speech. Several other measures included in the bill that may also 
impact terrorist internet use in the UK, such as the outlawing of ‘acts preparatory to 
terrorism’ and the giving or receiving of ‘terrorism training’, went largely uncontested 
in parliamentary debates. In the event, the Blair government was defeated on the 
detention issue. However, the remainder of the bill’s provisions went into force on 
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receiving royal assent on 30 March when the bill became the Terrorism Act 2006.11 
What impact the new legislation will have on terrorism-related materials produced by or 
disseminated to UK citizens via the internet is unknown at the time of writing.  
 
International Initiatives 
At the international level, the main content control initiatives have been undertaken by 
European countries with strong legislation in the area of hate speech, with European 
regional institutions trying to impose those same rules in cyberspace. The key 
international legal instrument addressing the issue of content is the Council of Europe’s 
Additional Protocol on the Cybercrime Convention. The protocol specifies various 
types of hate speech that should be prohibited on the internet, including racist and 
xenophobic materials, justification of genocide, and crimes against humanity. The 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is active in this field 
also. In June 2003, the OSCE Meeting on Freedom of Media and the Internet adopted 
the Amsterdam Recommendations on Freedom of the Media and the Internet. The 
recommendations promote freedom of expression and attempt to reduce censorship on 
the internet. In June 2004, the OSCE organised a Conference on the Relationship 
between Racist, Xenophobic, and Anti-Semitic Propaganda on the Internet and Hate 
Crimes. The focus of this event was on the potential misuses of the internet and freedom 
of expression. These OSCE events provided a wide range of academic and policy views 
addressing these two aspects of content control, though no new rules were instituted as a 
result of these discussions. 
The EU has also undertaken several initiatives in the context of content control, 
adopting the European Commission Recommendation against Racism via the Internet. 
On a more practical level, the EU also introduced the EU Safer Internet Action Plan, 
which resulted in the establishment of a European network of hotlines, known as 
Inhope, for reporting illegal content. At the present time, the major type of illegal 
content focused upon is child pornography and paedophilia. However, there is nothing 
stopping national governments or EU bodies from instituting a similar reporting system 
for terrorism-related content.  
 
 
The Role of Private Actors 
 
Legislating for terrorism-related content on the internet is clearly the domain of 
governments. However, because of the nature of the internet, private companies and 
groups are never far from the frontlines. In this section, the focus is on actors-other-
than-states and their contributions to the effort to eradicate terrorism-related materials 
from the internet. Two groups, in particular, are focused on here: internet search 
companies and hacktivists.  
 
Geo-Location Software 
In analyses of internet governance, one of the key arguments frequently advanced was 
that the decentralised nature of the internet made attempts at censorship redundant. 
Today, this is in many respects untrue: the internet includes many techniques and 
technologies that can provide effective control. Having said this, from a technology 
standpoint, control mechanisms can also be bypassed. In states with government-
directed content control, technically-savvy users have found ways around such controls. 
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Today, it is still difficult to identify exactly who is behind any given computer 
screen, but it is fairly straightforward to identify through which Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) the internet was accessed. The latest national laws worldwide require 
ISPs to identify their users and, if requested, to provide necessary information about 
them to authorities. Numerous governments have also announced plans to more closely 
monitor those who access the internet in public places, particularly internet cafes. 
Increased surveillance of the latter is now taking place in Italy, India, Thailand, and a 
host of other countries; the explanation generally offered is ‘national security’. 
Interestingly, the more the internet is anchored in geography, the less unique its 
governance will be. For example, with the possibility to geographically locate internet 
users and transactions, the complex question of jurisdiction on the internet can be solved 
more easily through existing laws. 
One technical solution is geo-location software, which filters access to particular 
internet content according to the national origin of users. The Yahoo! Case was 
important in this respect, since the group of experts involved indicated that in 90 per 
cent of cases, Yahoo! would be able to determine whether sections of one of its websites 
hosting Nazi memorabilia were being accessed from France. This technological 
assessment helped the court to come to a final decision. Geo-location software 
companies claim that they can currently identify the home country without mistake and 
the accessing city in about 85 per cent of cases, especially if it is a large city. Such 
software can therefore help internet content providers filter access according to 
nationality and thus avoid court cases in foreign jurisdictions.  
 
Content Control By Search Engines  
There are significant differences between the availability and the accessibility of online 
materials: the fact that particular web-based content is available on the internet does not 
mean that it can be easily accessed by large numbers of users. The bridge between the 
end user and web content is usually a search engine. Therefore, if a particular website 
cannot be found on Google, or another major search engine, its visibility is seriously 
diminished. On German and French versions of Google, it is not possible to search for 
and find websites with Nazi materials, for example. This indicates a certain level of self-
censorship on the part of Google in order to avoid possible court cases. In terms of 
terrorist websites, many internet companies voluntarily purged sites perceived as 
terrorist in the wake of 9/11. For example, Yahoo! pulled dozens of sites in the Jihad 
Web Ring, a coalition of 55 jihad-related sites, while Lycos Europe established a 20-
person team to monitor its websites for illegal activity and to remove terrorism-related 
content. Basically, major search engines are wont to err on the side of caution when it 
comes to their operation in ‘foreign’ jurisdictions and tend to comply with applicable 
legislation in those states in order to avoid legal challenges. However, such policies of 
compliance can be viewed as political in character and have thus come under fire, 
particularly from free-speech advocates. 
 
Hackers and Hacktivists 
The events of 9/11 acted as the spur for many private groups and individuals to take to 
the internet in search of ‘terrorist’ websites to disrupt. Computer hackers were 
particularly well placed to engage in this sort of activity. In the immediate aftermath of 
the attacks, for example, a group calling itself ‘The Dispatchers’ proclaimed that they 
would destroy web servers and internet access in Afghanistan and also target nations 
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that support terrorism. The group proceeded to deface hundreds of websites and launch 
Distributed Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against targets ranging from the Iranian 
Ministry of the Interior to the Presidential Palace of Afghanistan. Not all hacking groups 
were supportive of the so-called ‘hacking war’. On 14 September 2001, the Chaos 
Computer Club, an organization of German hackers, called for an end to the protests 
and for all hackers to cease vigilante actions. In the weeks following the attacks, web 
page defacements were well publicized, but the overall number and sophistication of 
these remained rather low. One possible reason for the non-escalation of attacks could 
be that many hackers were wary of being negatively associated with the events of 9/11 
and curbed their activities as a result.  
It’s never been all plain sailing for terrorist users of the internet, even prior to 
9/11. Their homepages have been subject to intermittent DoS and other hack attacks, 
and there have also been strikes against their ISPs that have resulted in more permanent 
difficulties. In 1997, for example, an e-mail bombing was conducted against the 
Institute for Global Communications (IGC), a San Francisco-based ISP, hosting the web 
pages of the Euskal Herria or Basque Country Journal, a publication edited by 
supporters of the Basque group Homeland and Liberty (ETA). The attacks against IGC 
commenced following the assassination of a popular town councillor in northern Spain 
by ETA. The protesters wanted the site pulled from the internet and IGC eventually 
removed it from their servers, but not before archiving a copy of the site enabling others 
to put up mirrors. Shortly thereafter, mirror sites appeared on half a dozen servers on 
three continents. Despite this, the protesters’ e-mail campaign raised fears of a new era 
of censorship imposed by direct action from anonymous hacktivists.  
Since 9/11 a number of more formal web-based organizations have been 
established to monitor terrorist websites. One of the most well-known of such sites is 
Internet Haganah, self-described as ‘an internet counterinsurgency’. Also prominent is 
the Washington, D.C.-based Search for International Terrorist Entities (SITE) Institute 
that, like Internet Haganah, focuses on Muslim terror groups. Clients of SITE’s fee-
based intelligence service are said to include the FBI, the Office of Homeland Security, 
and various media organizations. But what are the goals of these private organizations? 
SITE is a for-profit concern, while Internet Haganah survives on donations and 
advertising revenue. SITE's co-founder and director, Rita Katz, has commented: ‘It is 
actually to our benefit to have some of these terror sites up and running by US 
companies. If the servers are in the US, this is to our advantage when it comes to 
monitoring activities.’12 Aaron Weisburd, who runs Internet Haganah, says his goal is to 
keep the extremists moving from address to address: ‘The object isn't to silence them – 
the object is to keep them moving, keep them talking, force them to make mistakes, so 
we can gather as much information about them as we can, each step of the way.’13 On 
the Haganah website, the mark of victory is a little blue graphic of an AK-47 assault 
rifle, each of which represents another terrorist website put out of commission (at least 
temporarily). Weisburd’s modus operandi is to first research a site, he then makes a 
‘whois’ inquiry. If there is evidence of extremism, he contacts the hosting company and 
urges the host to remove the site from its servers. If successful, Internet Haganah may 
purchase the domain name so the address can never be used again. Since its inception in 
2003, Internet Haganah has taken credit for or claims to have assisted in the shutdown 
of more than 600 sites it alleges were linked to terrorism. 
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Conclusion: Where Do We Go From Here? 
 
The potential for a ‘digital 9/11’ in the near future is not great. This does not mean that 
IR scholars may continue to ignore the transformative powers of the internet. On the 
contrary, as of 9/11, the internet has come of age. Both terrorism and the internet are 
significant global phenomena, reflecting and shaping various aspects of world politics 
(sometimes separately but oftentimes in unison). Due to its global reach and rich 
multilingual context, the internet has the potential to influence in manifold ways many 
different types of political and social relations. Unlike the traditional mass media, the 
internet’s open architecture has restricted efforts by governments to regulate internet 
activities, which, in turn, has provided Netizens with immense freedom and space to 
shape the internet in their own likeness. Included within this cohort are terrorists who 
are not limiting themselves to the traditional means of communication; they 
increasingly employ the new media to pursue their goals. The terrorists of today, like 
those of yesteryear, are keen to exploit the traditional mass media while also 
recognizing the value of more direct communication channels.  
As far back as 1982, Alex Schmid and Janny De Graaf conceded that  
 
If terrorists want to send a message, they should be offered the opportunity 
to do so without them having to bomb and kill. Words are cheaper than 
lives. The public will not be instilled with terror if they see a terrorist speak; 
they are afraid if they see his victims and not himself […] If the terrorists 
believe that they have a case, they will be eager to present it to the public. 
Democratic societies should not be afraid of this.14  
 
Not everybody is in agreement with this position, however. Over time, both state- and 
non-state actors have endeavoured to curb the availability of terrorism-related materials 
online with varying degrees of success. Authoritarian governments have met with some 
success in this regard by deploying technologies that constrain their citizens’ ability to 
access certain sites. There are fewer options for restriction available to democratic 
governments, however, and although more restrictive legislation has recently been 
promulgated in a number of jurisdictions, it is not yet clear that it will be any more 
successful than previous attempts at controlling, for example, cyber-hate. In terms of 
terrorist websites, however, those private initiatives instituted by a range of sub-state 
actors in conjunction with ISPs have been much more successful. The activities of 
individual hacktivists raise a number of important issues relating to limits on speech and 
who has the ability to institute these limits, however. The capacity of private political 
and economic actors to bypass the democratic process and to have materials they find 
politically objectionable erased from the internet is a matter for concern. Such 
endeavours may, in fact, cause us to think again about the matter of legislation, not just 
in terms of putting controls in place – perhaps, for example, outlawing the posting and 
dissemination of beheading videos – but also writing into law more robust protections 
for radical political speech. 
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